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CASE OF S.H. AND OTHERS v. AUSTRIA: 
PRACTICAL CONCERN OVER  
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
David Kete* 
Abstract: The European Court of Human Rights upheld the constitution-
ality of the Austrian Artificial Procreation Act in November 2011. The 
Court decided the case on procedural grounds, claiming that the wide 
margin of appreciation given to European Union member states when 
there is no consensus within the EU on an issue. In doing so, the Court 
applied Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
but found that the procedural deference owed to the member state, Aus-
tria, outweighed the protections afforded by these articles. This Comment 
argues that while the court reached the correct result, it did so on im-
proper grounds, and left the state of the law unclear for future couples 
seeking to conceive children through artificial insemination. Future cou-
ples are left to debate whether enough states have changed their law to al-
low artificial insemination that the scales have tipped in their favor, and 
the margin of appreciation will allow the court to overturn member state 
law. 
Introduction 
 In November 2011, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld the constitutionality of the Austrian 
Artificial Procreation Act (APA), a law designed to limit the use of cer-
tain means of artificial procreation.1 The court held that this law, which 
prohibited any use of donated ova for in vitro fertilization, could survive 
a challenge under Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), even though it forbade the two couples who 
brought the suit from any possible means of having children where the 
mother would physically carry the child.2 
                                                                                                                      
* David Kete is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Re-
view. 
1 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00, ,Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011) ¶¶ 115–116, http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325#{"itemid":["001-107325"]}. 
2 Id. ¶¶ 15, 119–120. 
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 The ECtHR ruled that Austria could continue to enforce the APA 
because there was no consensus among member states as to whether ova 
donation for in vitro fertilization was an acceptable means of procrea-
tion.3 Since European Union (EU) member states have not reached a 
consensus on whether ova donation is permissible, the ECtHR afforded 
a wide margin of appreciation to Austria.4 In deciding the case based on 
the principle of margin of appreciation, the ECtHR found that the APA 
did not violate Article 8, which would otherwise apply to instances of 
procreation.5 The ECtHR took the Austrian government’s word that it 
had justified reasons for this interference, rather than applying a full 
Article 8 analysis.6 It refrained from performing this higher level of 
analysis because of the lower standard due to the wide margin of appre-
ciation.7 
 Part I of this Comment examines Article 8 of the ECHR, the lower 
court’s decision, and justification for that decision. Part II focuses on 
the standards in Article 8 and the doctrine of margin of appreciation, 
and examines the ECtHR’s holding in light of those provisions. Part III 
analyzes the concurring opinion and dissent, while pointing out possi-
ble problems in determining the law for future couples desiring to use 
artificial conception. 
I. Background 
 On November 3, 2011, the ECtHR decided the case of S.H. and 
Others v. Austria.8 The case was originally filed in Austria in 1999 by two 
couples, Ms. H., Mr. H., Ms. G. and Mr. G. who could not have children 
through natural means of procreation.9 The couples contended that 
the APA violated Article 8 of the ECHR, as well as Article 8 in conjunc-
tion with Article 14.10 
 Mr. H. and Ms. H., and Mr. G. and Ms. G. initially filed the suit with 
the Austrian Constitutional Court for a review of the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. ¶¶ 106, 115–116. 
4 Id. ¶ 94. 
5 Id. ¶ 113. 
6 See id. 
7 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 94, 113. 
8 App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 119–120 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3, 2011), http://hudoc. 
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325#{"itemid":["001-107325"]}. 
9 Id. ¶¶ 1, 11–12. , The court did not use the applicants’ full names at their request. Id. 
¶ 1. Ms. H. cannot conceive children naturally because of a blocked fallopian tube, and 
Mr. H., her husband, is also infertile. Id. ¶ 11. Ms. G. cannot conceive children naturally 
because she cannot produce ova, though her husband, Mr. G., is fertile himself. Id. ¶ 12. 
10 Id. ¶ 3. 
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sections 3(1) and 3(2) of the APA.11 Ms. H. and Mr. H. could only con-
ceive a child if an ova were to be removed from Ms. H., fertilized with 
donor sperm, and then implanted back in Ms. H.’s uterus.12 This proc-
ess violates the APA, which only allows in vitro fertilization if the egg 
comes from the mother and sperm comes from the father.13 Ms. G. and 
Mr. G. can only conceive a child through a donor egg, which would be 
fertilized with Mr. G.’s own sperm, and then implanted in Ms. G.’s 
uterus.14 This process also violates the APA since it involves egg dona-
tion.15 
 The Constitutional Court decided the case on October 14, 1999.16 
It determined that Article 8 protects the right of a couple to use artifi-
cial techniques to conceive a child.17 However, the court recognized 
that Article 8 also allows for the restriction of a protected right if there 
were conflicting issues of human dignity and the rights of the child.18 
The court upheld the law, ruling that the potential problems that ova 
donation could cause for the child, as well as possible threats to the 
dignity of ova donors, were sufficient to justify a prohibition of ova do-
nation, even under Article 8.19 
  The case was then admitted to the First Section of the ECtHR 
(First Section) and decided on the merits in 2010.20 The First Section 
decided that the APA violated Article 14 read in conjunction with Arti-
cle 8, in the cases of both Mr. and Mrs. H. and Mr. and Mrs. G.21 The 
First Section also decided that since there was a violation of Article 14, 
there was no need to analyze whether there was also a violation of Arti-
cle 8 alone.22 The First Section thought all of the government’s reasons 
                                                                                                                      
11 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 13. The Austrian Constitutional Court is the 
court charged with determining whether Austrian law complies with the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Austrian Fed. Ministry of Just., The Austrian Judicial 
System § 3.2.2 (2009), available at http://www.justiz.gv.at/internet/file/8ab4ac8322985dd 
501229ce2e2d80091.en.0/die_justiz_eng_05.09.pdf; EU Rights Charter Equal to Constitution: 
Austrian Court, EU Business (May 4, 2012, 13:32 CET), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu/austria-law-rights.gc4. 
12 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 14. 
13 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz [Artificial Procreation Act] Bundesgesetzblatt 
[BGBl] No. 275/1992, § 3(1)–3(3) (Austria); S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00, ¶ 27. 
14 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 14. 
15 Id. ¶ 31. 
16 Id. ¶ 17. 
17 Id. ¶ 18. 
18 Id. ¶ 19. 
19 Id. ¶ 19–25. 
20 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 4. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
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for prohibiting ova donation (including avoiding exploitation of wom-
en, protecting the future child, preventing the selection of children) 
were insufficient to restrict the personal freedom that should be af-
forded to everyone in deciding whether to procreate.23 The First Sec-
tion thus overturned the Austrian Constitutional Court’s ruling and 
held that Article 14 (prohibiting discrimination), when read in con-
junction with Article 8, prohibited enforcement of the APA.24 
 The Austrian government then appealed the decision to the EC-
tHR, which decided the case in November 2011.25 While the state had 
noted several concerns with in vitro fertilization, the ECtHR ruled that 
the case came down to a balancing between the highly important right 
of choosing to procreate and the fact that there was no consensus 
among the member states of the EU on the permissibility of in vitro fer-
tilization.26 The ECtHR noted that rights that are more fundamental 
should be fiercely protected from government interference.27 But, the 
ECtHR also noted that governments are normally free to interfere on 
issues where there is a lack of consensus by other European states.28 
The ECtHR upheld the law due to the wide margin of appreciation af-
forded the Austrian government.29 But, the ECtHR also acknowledged 
that the rapid advances of science could change public opinion, creat-
ing a consensus among member states to allow ova donation for artifi-
cial insemination.30 If this were to be the case, the margin of apprecia-
tion for the APA would be much less, and the APA would probably 
violate Article 8.31 
II. Discussion 
A. The Artificial Procreation Act 
 The APA regulates all means of conceiving a child outside of natu-
ral sexual intercourse.32 The Austrian government passed the law in 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. ¶ 55. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. ¶¶ 2, 119–120. 
26 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 94, 113. 
27 Id. ¶ 94. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 112–118. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 See Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz [Artificial Procreation Act] Bundesge-
setzblatt [BGBl] No. 275/1992, § 3(1)–3(3) (Austria) (regulating what reproductive 
material may be donated, the circumstances surrounding the donation of reproductive 
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1992, partially to deal with new methods of conception, including in 
vitro fertilization.33 Among other things, the APA regulates the types of 
reproductive material that people may donate.34 The main provision in 
this case prohibits ovum donation under any circumstances.35 
 The Austrian government justified the law for several reasons.36 
First, the government desired to avoid procreation that was too far re-
moved from natural means of procreation.37 Second, the government 
sought to avoid exploitation of poorer women who might feel pressure 
to donate ova for money.38 Third, the government wanted to protect 
children from the trauma of having more than one mother (the ova 
donor and the birth mother).39 Fourth, it desired to avoid parents seek-
ing ova donors with particular qualities, amounting to selective repro-
duction, and because there is no consensus on acceptable techniques 
for artificial procreation.40 
 The applicants correctly pointed out that many of these same con-
cerns could be applied to permitted means of artificial procreation, as 
well as adoption.41 The applicants noted that there is no pressure on 
the women in this case to donate ova for money, so that consideration 
should be ignored.42 Also, sperm donation is still permitted in some 
circumstances, indicating the government’s belief that it is permissible 
for some children to grow up only genetically related to one parent.43 
Finally, there are other ways to avoid selective reproduction without a 
blanket prohibition on ova donation.44 Since these concerns apply to 
permitted actions as well as the prohibited act of ova donation, they 
cannot be the only reasons causing the APA to prohibit ova donation.45 
                                                                                                                      
material, and which physicians may be able to perform such procedures); S.H. v. Austria, 
App. No. 57813/00, ¶ 27 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3, 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325#{"itemid":["001-107325"]} . 
33 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00, ¶¶ 27–31. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. ¶¶ 19, 64, 101. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 19, 64, 101. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. ¶ 58. For example, an adopted child still has two mothers, a birth mother and 
adopted mother. See id. Sperm donation, which raises the same concerns about selective 
reproduction, is still allowed. See id. 
42 See id. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. ¶ 105. 
45 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 58. 
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B. Procreation Laws in Other Nations 
 EU member nations have not reached a consensus as to whether 
ova donation should be allowed at all, including for in vitro fertilization 
purposes.46 Italy, Lithuania, and Turkey completely prohibit in vitro fer-
tilization.47 Croatia, Germany, Norway, and Switzerland prohibit ova 
donation for in vitro fertilization.48 Many countries also have these re-
strictions on family life, but there is no real consensus condemning the-
se restrictions. In Cyprus, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, and Roma-
nia, for example, ova donation is allowed.49 Since there is no consensus 
throughout Europe, the government is afforded a wider margin of ap-
preciation in promulgating its own law.50 
C. Article 8 
 Article 8 of the ECHR establishes the right to privacy and says that 
the government cannot interfere with this right unless it is necessary 
for purposes of national security, public safety, the protection of morals, 
or the protection of freedoms.51 The main argument of the applicants 
is that the APA violates this right because it interferes with family life 
and is not justified as being in the interest of national security, or any of 
the other possible justifications.52 
 First, the applicants established that the right to choose how to 
have a family is protected by Article 8.53 To do so, they relied on the 
previous cases Evans v. United Kingdom, and Dickson v. United Kingdom.54 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id. ¶¶ 35–40. 
47 Id. ¶ 95 
48 Id. 
49 Id. ¶ 39. 
50 Id. ¶¶ 35, 95. 
51 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, 
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
(1) Everyone has a right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Id. 
52 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 59. 
53 See id. ¶ 61. 
54 Id. ¶¶ 80–81. 
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In Evans, the ECtHR held that “the notion of ‘private life’ incorpo-
rate[s] the right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to 
become a parent.”55 In Dickson the ECtHR similarly held that “Article 8 
is applicable to the applicants’ complaints in that the refusal of artificial 
insemination facilities concerned their private and family lives, which 
notions incorporate the right to respect for their decision to become 
genetic parents.”56 The ECtHR acknowledged that these cases estab-
lished Article 8 protection for the right to have children.57 Additionally, 
both sides agreed that the APA implicates Article 8(1), protecting pri-
vate and family life.58 
 Once the ECtHR found that the APA implicated Article 8(1), it 
moved to an analysis of Article 8(2) because the APA had to implicate 
both sections in order to be prohibited under Article 8.59 The ECtHR 
found that the APA did not implicate Article 8(2) because the APA fit 
under the exceptions stated in Article 8(2).60 The Austrian government 
noted five main concerns with allowing ova donation for in vitro fertili-
zation.61 These were: to avoid procreation that was “too far removed 
from natural means of conception;” to avoid exploitation of women; to 
protect children from the trauma of having more than one mother; to 
avoid selective reproduction; and because of a lack of consensus on ac-
ceptable techniques for artificial procreation.62 Here, the court decided 
that these concerns were all valid and sought to protect the health, 
morals and freedom of others.63 Since these concerns are related to the 
protection of health, morals, and freedom, they fall under Article 8(2), 
and allow the government to regulate an area that would normally be 
protected.64 
 The ECtHR thus faced the problem of whether to give the individ-
ual interest, protected by Article 8(1), or the government’s interest, 
protected by Article 8(2), more weight.65 The ECtHR noted that its task 
was to determine, in this particular situation, whether the law protected 
                                                                                                                      
55 Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 728, 750–51 (2007). 
56 Dickson v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44362/04, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 927, 945 (2007) 
(citations omitted). 
57 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 80–82. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. ¶¶ 82, 89–90. 
60 See id. ¶¶ 92, 113. 
61 Id. ¶¶ 19, 64. 
62 Id. 
63 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 90. 
64 Id. ¶¶ 50, 90. 
65 Id. ¶ 92–94. 
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legitimate governmental interests, or whether it merely hindered indi-
vidual freedom.66 The concerns about the sale of ova, or about selective 
reproduction were irrelevant, because while those issues might arise in 
the future, they did not arise in this particular instance, and it is not the 
court’s job to make policy considerations.67 The court noted that this 
case arose from the individual application of the law and, as such, the 
decision must be confined to the facts.68 In this case, concerns about 
the mother being pressured into selling ova, or of parents genetically 
engineering a child through selective reproduction, do not apply and 
thus are not points that can be considered, significantly weakening the 
government’s position.69 This leaves only the concerns for human dig-
nity, concerns for the child’s well-being, and lack of consensus of mem-
ber states, as factors weighing in favor of the constitutionality of the 
law.70 
 The ECtHR could have used one of two different principles to 
weigh the individual interest of Article 8(1) against the governmental 
interest of Article 8(2).71 These principles pull the court in opposite 
directions.72 First, there is the principle that when a fundamental right 
is at stake, the government has a high burden of proof to show that it is 
necessary to interfere.73 Contrary to this principle is that of the margin 
of appreciation.74 The ECtHR must give a wide margin of appreciation, 
or wide latitude to member states in promulgating a law, when there is 
a lack of a consensus on a particular issue, especially when it involves a 
sensitive moral issue.75 
D. Margin of Appreciation 
 Despite not being mentioned explicitly in the ECHR, the margin 
of appreciation doctrine was created by the ECtHR early in its exis-
tence.76 It is, most simply, the degree to which the ECtHR will defer to 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. ¶ 91. 
67 See id. ¶¶ 58–59, 92. 
68 Id. ¶ 92. 
69 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 58. 
70 See id. ¶¶ 19, 64, 101. 
71 Id. ¶ 94. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 93–94. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. ¶ 94. 
75 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 94. 
76 See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 113, 117 (2005) (cit-
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member states in carrying out the directives of the ECHR.77 In the con-
text of Article 8, it works in the following manner.78 The first clause says 
that the government cannot interfere with anyone’s private life.79 How-
ever, the second clause qualifies this prohibition on interference by say-
ing that a government may interfere with private life if it serves some 
greater purpose of protecting health, morals, public safety, economic 
well-being, the prevention of crime, or the protections of the freedoms 
of others.80 The ECtHR has held that the right to procreate and the 
manner in which someone procreates are protected under the Article 8 
right to privacy.81 
 Normally, the court would weigh whether the government’s reason 
for interference was justified under the second part of Article 8.82 How-
ever, the margin of appreciation doctrine alters the way that courts will 
weigh the various provisions of Article 8.83 The fact that there is no con-
sensus among member nations means that the court will afford the 
Austrian government a wider margin of appreciation, and in doing so 
accept the government’s justification under Article 8 with much less 
scrutiny.84 But, the court noted that when a particularly important right 
was being called into question, the court would afford the government 
a narrower margin of appreciation.85 
 In its analysis of the APA, the ECtHR first had to determine what 
margin of scrutiny to use.86 The fact that the right to privacy is such an 
important right suggests that the court should use a narrow margin of 
appreciation and perform a strict Article 8 analysis.87 The lack of con-
sensus among member states as to whether ova donation should be al-
lowed suggests a wider margin of appreciation.88 Ultimately, the court 
                                                                                                                      
ing Greece v. United Kingdom, App. No. 176/56, 1958–1959 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
174 (using the term “margin of appreciation” for the first time)). 
77 Brauch, supra note 76, at 115–16. 
78 See id. at 116. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 82. 
82 See Nada v. Switzerland, App. No. 10593/08 ¶¶ 163–166 (Eur. Ct. H.R., Sept. 12, 
2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113118#{"itemid": 
["001-113118"]}. 
83 See Brauch, supra note 76, at 116. 
84 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 94. 
85 Id. ¶ 93. 
86 Id. ¶¶ 91–97. 
87 Id. ¶ 93. 
88 Id. ¶ 94. 
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applied a wide margin of appreciation to the APA, and so it did not 
conduct a very rigorous Article 8 analysis.89 
 The ECtHR ultimately said that the lack of consensus among 
member nations weighed more heavily than the individual interest.90 
Therefore, the APA was permitted under Article 8.91 The court, in do-
ing so, said that that because of the lack of a consensus, it afforded the 
Austrian government a wide margin of appreciation in promulgating 
this law.92 But, this decision also left the door open for changes in the 
law.93 It seemed important to the decision that the science at issue had 
not been around for very long, yet, as the dissent pointed out, the sci-
ence on which the decision was based was already nearly twenty years 
old.94 This begs the question of whether a new case, with modern sci-
ence, may be able to defeat this concern.95 Additionally, the court did 
not define any clear standard for what would constitute enough of a 
consensus to overturn this decision.96 
 The concurrence97 agreed that the APA did not violate Article 8, 
but rather than deciding based on granting the Austrian government a 
wide margin of appreciation, it decided the case based on the broader 
principles of protecting human rights.98 It examined the principles be-
hind the ECHR, mainly that its purpose was to protect human dignity.99 
While the concurrence acknowledged the importance of the right to 
have children, it noted that the second part of Article 8 holds that this 
right should not be upheld at any cost.100 It concluded that divorcing 
procreation from a personal act between a man and a woman was of-
fensive to human dignity, and was thus too high a price to pay for the 
personal right to have a child.101 
                                                                                                                      
89 See id. ¶ 106 (“[T]he Court attaches some importance to the fact that, as noted 
above, there is no sufficiently established European consensus as to whether ova donation 
for in vitro fertilization should be allowed.”). 
90 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 106, 115–116. 
91 Id. ¶¶ 115–116. 
92 Id. ¶ 97. 
93 Id. ¶ 118. 
94 Id.; see S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 4 ( joint dissenting opinion of Tulkens, 
J.). 
95 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶ 6 (dissenting opinion of Tulkens, J.). 
96 See id. ¶ 11 ( joint dissenting opinion of Tulkens, J.). 
97 At the ECtHR, opinions written by judges who vote with the majority are filed as a 
“separate opinion” rather than a concurring opinion, but I use the term “concurring opin-
ion” or “concurrence” to avoid confusion. See id. (separate opinion of DeGaetano, J.). 
98 Id. ¶ 6 (separate opinion of DeGaetano, J.). 
99 Id. ¶ 2. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
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 The dissent pointed out that the majority seemed to weigh the 
wide margin of appreciation for issues that lack a European consensus 
more heavily than the fact that there is a very important right being 
interfered with by the government.102 It noted that there is no reason 
for this, and that the science that the majority based its decision on is 
ten years old, and very well could have changed in that timeframe.103 
III. Analysis 
 The ECtHR, in applying a wide margin of appreciation, not only 
failed to properly analyze the APA under Article 8, but also left the sit-
uation unclear for future couples who desire to use donated ova for in 
vitro fertilization in Austria.104 The court said that it would be open to 
change as other nations change their laws, yet it gave no standard for 
how many nations would need to allow this practice of ova donation 
before the right to use this practice would be protected under Article 
8.105 The ECtHR should have applied a narrower margin of apprecia-
tion, conducted a more thorough Article 8 analysis, and found that the 
law was permitted because it was designed to protect the health and 
dignity of the parents.106 
A. A Clearer Standard 
 The opinion of the ECtHR was less clear than it could have been 
because it became mired in its restrictions as a supranational body.107 It 
tried to finesse the issue of in vitro fertilization by addressing the mar-
gin of appreciation question, as opposed to the substantive issue: Arti-
cle 8.108 In doing so, the court gave an unclear standard, leaving future 
                                                                                                                      
102 S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶¶ 6, 8 ( joint dissenting opinion of Tulkens, J.). 
103 Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
104 Cf. Alexandra Timmer, SH and Others v. Austria: Margin of Appreciation and IVF, 
Strausbourg Observers (Nov. 9, 2011), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2011/11/09/s-
h-and-others-v-austria-margin-of-appreciation-and-ivf/ (noting that the feelings of member 
nations towards ova donation are changing rapidly, but not giving a clear standard for 
when enough change has taken place to narrow the margin of appreciation). 
105 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00, ¶ 8 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 3, 2011), http:// 
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-107325#{"itemid":["001-107325"]} 
( joint dissenting opinion of Tulkens, J.). 
106 See id. ¶ 3. 
107 See S.H. v. Austria, App. No. 57813/00 ¶106. 
108 See id. (“The central question in terms of Article 8 of the Convention is not whether 
a different solution might have been adopted by the legislature . . . but whether . . . the 
Austrian legislature exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to it under that Arti-
cle.”) (citations omitted). 
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couples to guess as to what point in time enough states have allowed in 
vitro fertilization for the margin of appreciation to no longer be wide 
enough to permit the APA.109 The court was not bound to make such a 
limited ruling since, as the court of human rights, its responsibility is to 
protect human rights in all member nations and to be a watchdog over 
domestic courts.110 In fact, some legal scholars have pushed to abolish 
the margin of appreciation doctrine altogether, suggesting that the 
courts should focus only on the issues under the ECHR.111 
 The concurrence correctly focused on the overarching purpose of 
the ECtHR.112 It held that the court must be guided by the fact that it 
exists to carry out the main goal of the ECHR: to protect human dig-
nity.113 The concurring opinion noted that divorcing procreation from 
a natural act comes at a cost.114 It claimed that this cost to human dig-
nity might be even higher than the benefit gained by allowing personal 
choice.115 In choosing to approach the issue in this way, the concur-
rence addressed the heart of this issue: whether ova donation for in vi-
tro fertilization should be allowed.116 
  In Evans v. United Kingdom, the court held that while a woman’s 
access to certain methods of artificial procreation is necessitated by Ar-
ticle 8, it is not an absolute right to access.117 Here, the court weighed 
one person’s right to have a child against another person’s desire not to 
have a child, and ruled that the right to have a child was not more im-
portant than the right not to have a child.118 Although the court con-
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sidered the margin of appreciation, in this case it did weigh the rights 
of the two parties.119 The ECtHR should have adopted the same ap-
proach in this case, balancing the right of a woman to have a child with 
the cost to human dignity of artificial procreation.120 
B. Future Cases 
 The court, in limiting its decision to a respect for Austrian law 
based on the wide margin of appreciation afforded to nations when 
there is no European consensus on an issue, created a confusing prece-
dent.121 The court said nothing about when a challenge to the APA un-
der Article 8 might be successful.122 Is it solely dependent on the num-
ber of states that allow or prohibit in vitro fertilization?123 Are there 
other scientific concerns as well?124 Must the court take into account 
new developments in technology?125 The ECtHR’s decision left these 
questions unanswered.126 
 The opinion correctly points out that many of the government’s 
reasons for prohibiting in vitro fertilization could also be applied to 
sperm donation and even adoption.127 For instance, an adopted child 
would encounter the same hardship of having two mothers (his natural 
mother and adopted mother), as a child who had one mother whose 
ova he came from and another mother who carried him.128 These con-
cerns are arguably merely post-hoc justifications for the law, as opposed 
to actually criteria for rejecting the possibility for in vitro fertilization.129 
It appears as though the only real justification for the prohibition of in 
vitro fertilization is the fact that there are many nations that also pro-
hibit it, and so Austria is afforded a wide margin of appreciation to pass 
this law.130 
 The ECtHR should have weighed the first and second parts of Ar-
ticle 8 and found that while the right to have children is protected by 
the Article, the cost to human dignity resulting from divorcing the nat-
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ural procreative act from conception is too high, and violates Article 
8(2).131 This would establish a clear rule that is not dependent on the 
consensus of member states, and one that EU citizens can easily follow 
in future cases.132 The court should have taken its own advice from Ev-
ans, when it stated, “strong policy considerations . . . favour a clear or 
‘bright line’ rule which would serve both to produce legal certainty and 
to maintain public confidence in the law in a sensitive field.”133 By pro-
claiming a bright line rule, the ECtHR would have eliminated uncer-
tainty and remained true to Article 8 of the ECHR.134 
Conclusion 
 The ECtHR’s decision to uphold the APA based on giving Austria a 
wide margin of appreciation in this sensitive moral topic created a con-
fusing environment for those who wish to use donated ova for in vitro 
fertilization in future cases. The court tried to justify its decision based 
on the protection of women, avoiding split motherhood, the protection 
of children, and the fear of selective reproduction, in addition to the 
margin of appreciation. But all of the reasons for prohibiting ova dona-
tion could also apply to permitted methods of artificial reproduction, 
so this reasoning fails, leaving the only the margin of appreciation. 
 By not giving any guidance as to how many nations would have to 
repeal their bans before the APA was no longer permissible under Arti-
cle 8, the court left this question for future couples to decide. The 
court should have upheld the ban based on basic principles of human 
dignity and noted that the right to privacy in family life, while impor-
tant, is not an absolute right, and must not be given at the expense of 
general human dignity. In so separating the personal act between a 
man and a woman from procreation, and by conceiving children out-
side the body, in vitro fertilization offends human dignity and violates 
the ECHR. By making a ruling based on this, the court would have 
truly upheld human dignity and given a clear standard for future cou-
ples to follow. 
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